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JEROME F. DONOVAN*

Nigeria after "Indigenization":
Is There Any Room Left for
the American Businessman?
Introduction
Most American businessmen who keep up with opportunities in trade and
investment abroad are familiar with the increasingly important position of
Nigeria in the world economy. The most populous' and richest 2 of all black
African nations, she has an abundance of two resources much coveted by the
industrialized world: oil' and gas.' The country is administered by a military
government, but its tone is one of moderation,' not the truculence Americans
have come to expect from the colonels and generals who often rule developing
countries.
Moveover, Nigeria has a history of amicable commercial relations with the
U.S., 6 and the greatly increased volume of foreign exchange becoming available
to Nigeria (overwhelmingly from oil revenue) 7 will permit an even larger volume
of trade and investment in the future.
*Member of the Washington, D.C., Bar; Columbia Law School (J.D. 1961), Yale University
(A.B. 19S8); member, Panel on Trade Policy and Institutions, American Society of International
Law, American Arbitration Ass'n (Panel of Arbitrators).
'Nigerian population has been reliably estimated at 65 million. African Progress (April 1973) at
40. This estimate will likely be confirmed by the 1973 census, whose results are not yet known.
'The government estimates that the Gross Domestic Product grew 10 percent in 1972-73 to $7.0
billion, a per capita GDP of some $100. The GDP is expected to be about $11.5 billion by 1975 and
about $18.4 billion by 1980, for an average annual compound growth rate of 9.8 percent. Fed.
Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction (Central Planning Office), Guidelines for
the Third National Development Plan 1975-1980 (1973). See also 3 NIGERIAN Bus. DIGEST
(September 1973) at 6.
'By October 1973, daily production of high-grade, low-sulphur crude oil had reached 2.2 billion
barrels. U.S. Department of Commerce (Investment Resources Division), Economic Trends Report
from Nigeria (Dec. 10, 1973) at 4. This made it the sixth largest oil producing country. New York
Times, Nov. 23, 1973, at 55, col. 5.
'Over 1 billion cubic feet of natural gas is being burned off daily from oil refineries in the Niger
River Delta. A huge investment will be required to liquefy and ship this gas to industrial markets.
but the planning for the project is well underway. Op. cit., supra n. 1, at 38.
'Gen. Yokubu Gowon, age 40, is a skilled conciliator who has announced his intention to return

Nigeria to civilian control in 1976. See generally SATURDAY

REVIEW-WORLD

(Feb. 9, 1974) at 14

if

1'he U.S. is Nigeria's second best customer and supplier. Our exports are primarily in
agricultural products and capital equipment; our imports are in cocoa, rubber, peanut and palm
crops, and, of course, oil. Op. cit., supra 1, at 36.
'Nigeria's oil revenue was $1.5 billion in 1972-73 when the posted price of crude was $4.39 a
barrel; some 27 percent of Nigeria's production that year went to the U.S. New York Times, supra
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Nonetheless, American businessmen today are exceedingly wary about
investing in any developing country, especially in Africa. Racism in the South,
drought and famine through the middle, and Libyan-style nationalization in the
North are persuasive disincentives. Add to these fears an undifferentiated feeling
that African states are inherently volatile politically, and the fact that most businessmen, who do not have to be in Africa for, say, the oil, bauxite, or copper,
look elsewhere.
Most of the usual cliches that justly apply to doing business in much of Africa
and other developing areas simply do not apply to Nigeria, however. Although it
is only now fully emerging from its searing civil war, 8 Nigeria is taking control of
her resources and destiny in a manner more calculated to encourage foreign
businessmen than to scare them off.
The "Indigenizatlon Decree"
Early in 1972, the federal military government of Nigeria issued an
"Indigenization Decree" 9 which became effective on March 31, 1974. Its
purpose was to eliminate or restrict foreign ownership in 55 non-agricultural
sectors of the economy. These sectors were divided into two schedules. Schedule
1" comprised 22 relatively unsophisticated occupations that require minimum
technical skill and were for the most part already dominated by Nigerians.
Examples are hairdressing" and trucking." Schedule 2'3 comprised 33
relatively more sophisticated businesses, examples of which are furniture manufacturing 4 and book printing. 5
6
The Decree prohibited all foreign ownership of Schedule 1 enterprises.'
n. 3. The price jumped to $8.31 a barrel in October 1973, and to $14.69 in January 1974, an
increase that could well yield more than $6 billion per year in revenue. New York Times, Jan. 27,
1974, §F at 73, col. 1. Reasonably enough, the official Guidelines for the Third National
Development Plan 1975-1980 predict that the availability of foreign exchange to finance the Plan's
many projects "is unlikely to feature as a major problem." See also West Africa (Sept. 3, 1973) at
1214.
'Nigeria has three major tribes: the Hausas in the North (50 percent of the population); the Ibos
in the East (25 percent); and the Yorubas in the West (20 percent). The remaining 5 percent of the
population is distributed among some 180 smaller tribes. In 1967, the Ibos seceded, establishing the
Biafran State. Federal forces put down the rebellion in 1970 and restructured Nigeria into a twelvestate federal republic within four main regions, the boundaries of which run generally along tribal
lines.
'Formally known as the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972, Decree No. 4, dated
February 23, 1972, 59 Fed. Rep. of Nigeria Official Gazette (Supp.) (Feb. 28, 1972) Allff (hereinafter referred to as the Decree), it is popularly, if clumsily, referred to as the "Nigerianization
Decree" or the "Indigenization Decree."
"Decree §16 at A18.
"Schedule 1, Item 11, Decree at A19.
"Schedule 1, Item 12, Decree at A19.
3
Op. cit., supra n. 10.
"Schedule 2, Item 13, Decree at A20.
"Schedule 2, Item 27, Decree at A20.
"Decree §4 at A13.
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Foreigners may own up to 60 percent of Schedule 2 enterprises, but only if the
affected company had either a paid up capital exceeding $600,000 or an annual
turnover exceeding $1.5 million; 7 and the government decided which of the
two tests to apply. (Member states of the Organization of African Unity were
exempted from thel Decree.)18
The Decree also established the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board
(NEPB), 9 -with power to enforce the Decree nationwide, and Enterprise
Promotion Committees2 ° in each of the twelve states to "assist and advise the
[NEPB] on the implementation of the Decree, and to ensure that [its] provisions
are complied with by aliens resident in every State." 2'
In 1972, all companies with any foreign ownership were required to inform
the appropriate Enterprise Promotion Committee of the nature of their
respective businesses, the nationalities of their owners, their capitalization, and
their cash flows. The Committee, with the approval of the NEPB, then informed
the companies of their classifications for purposes of the Decree-i.e.,
Schedule 1, Schedule 2, or exempted altogether. Aggrieved companies could
appeal to the Federal Commissioner for Industries for exemptions, but appeals
to Nigerian courts were prohibited. 22 Firms that had obtained neither
exemptions nor extensions of the two-year time limit within which to divest the
required percentages of foreign ownership were subject to being seized and sold
by the NEPB, with the proceeds remitted to the owners, 23 a startlingly refreshing change from most modern nationalization practices.
Indeed, President Gowon went to unusual lengths to reassure foreigners that
he intended to provide both fair compensation and easy repatriation of the
proceeds of the sales of all or portions of their businesses.2 4 He has also repeatedly denied any intention of totally nationalizing the more important
sectors of the economy. The Chairman of the NEPB was also deliberately
moderate in his policy statements. 2 s
Implementation of the Decree
26
Considering the pervasive extent of foreign ownership of Nigerian business,

'Decree §5 at A13-A14.

"Op. cit., supra n. 10.

"Decree §I at A11.
"°Decree§2 at A12-A13.
""Explanatory Note," Decree at A21.
"Decree §15 at A18.
"Decree §12 at A16-A18.
'4Presidential Statement, April 1, 1973.
"'The NEPB Chairman, in his first official pronouncement, warned his countrymen against "an
inflexible approach which wvould lead to a negative result with ill-effect on the pace of development
or its desirable extent." He added that, "it is not [the government's] intention to eliminate foreign
investment participation in our economy.
...U.S. Department of Commerce (Investment
Resources Div.), Establishment of the Indigenization Board (June 8, 1972) at 2.
2
According to an industrial survey, 70 percent of Nigeria's 625 largest manufacturing companies
were controlled by foreigners as late as 1968. New York Times, Oct. 2, 1973, at 17, col. 1.
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indigenization has gone surprisingly smoothly, especially among the larger
enterprises. 2
American-owned businesses have been among the most innovative in their
compliance and, in so doing, have underscored the areas not covered by the
Decree. For example, a trucking company whose activities fell within Schedule
1, restructured itself as a leasing company, an unaffected line of business. A
chicken farm (also Schedule 1) sold out to a Nigerian investor, but negotiated a
management contract. (The Decree did not mandate indigenization of in-house
management either, with the result that, theoretically, foreigners could continue
to conduct most of the country's major businesses from the board rooms. This
loophole could conceivably defeat the purpose of the Decree and will likely be
closed in the near future.)2 8
Even foot-dragging on the part of some foreigners was met with rather gentle
chiding, not belligerence, by Nigerian officials. The country's leading business
periodical reacted as follows to one such case:
Despite the Indigenization Decree, it appears some expatriates are still daft
enough not to fall in with the mood of the country. For example, the whole country was
shocked recently when the Federal Commissioner for Industries, Dr. J. E. Adetoro,
openly decried
the lack of effort of an expatriate Company in implementing [the
29
Decree].
Hardly a fire-eating threat.
Some political leaders, to be sure, react to any signs of reluctance to comply
with the Decree in a xenophobic manner more typical of other developing
countries. For Example, the Federal Commissioner for Works and Housing, in
arguing that the benefits of indigenization should be widely spread among
Nigerians of all classes, once intimated that "alien capitalists" might not be as
welcome in Nigeria as before. 30 He was immediately and caustically
challenged by the president of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
who accused him of advancing his own brand of Fabian Socialism and
concluded:
The Decree's objective is not to eliminate "aliens" from our economy because they
are "capitalists." On the contrary, the cardinal aim of the Decree is to progressively
divest foreign investment into projects requiring large capitals [sic] or specialized skill
or both, so as to promote indigenous enterprise in areas where Nigerian businessmen's
competence are [sic] established; in other words, "to ensure that foreign investments
are complementary to, rather than competitive with indigenous enterprise," but
ultimately to ensure that the commanding heights of the economy are indigenously
controlled. 3
27

2

New York Times, Jan. 27, 1974, supra n. 7.

'U.S. Department of Commerce (Investment Resources Div.), Guidelines for Nigeria's Third

NationalDevelopment Plan, 1975-80: Implicationsfor U.S. Trade and Investment (Sept. 24, 1973)

at 2.
NIGERIAN Bus. DIGEST (August 1973) at 5.
1°3 NIGERIAN Bus. DIGEST (November 1973) at 8.
11d.
293
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It is doubtful that a stouter exposition of the expatriate's position could have
been drafted by any foreign businessman.
Some post-indigenization diminution of the quality and quantity of goods and
services traditionally provided by foreign-owned companies was expected and
has occurred. There may even have been some initial falling off of foreign
investment as foreigners wait until the dust settles. But the government rightly
considers these costs to be insignificant when compared with the benefits of
indigenization to Nigeria, a process which one official justifiably described as
"the boldest step taken by any country in Africa to help its citizens in running
the economy of their country.""
One of the most far-sighted steps taken by the government to implement
indigenization was the establishing in October 1973 of the Nigerian Bank for
Commerce and Industry. The Bank's two main functions were to finance
Nigerians' purchases for foreign-owned companies and to act as the "buyer of
last resort" of shares of foreign-owned companies for which no immediate
Nigerian buyers could be found. The Bank was also empowered to make
commercial loans to the newly Nigerianized businesses to ease cash flow problems which are sure to arise during the transition period. The Bank's regulations
require purchasers of businesses to put up 30 percent of the price; the Bank will
not acquire more than a 40 percent interest in any company nor make a loan of
under $30,000," 3 preferring to leave the smaller loans to the commercial banks.
Since the amount of capital required to implement indigenization is reliably
estimated at between $150 million and $225 million,3 4 it is clear that an
institution such as the Bank was required. Although the Bank's capitalization
has not been publicized, it is doubtless large enough to do the job."5
Foreign-owned commerical banks played and continue to play an important
role in the process, too. One of them made loans to Nigerian employees of
companies covered by the Decree so that the employees could subscribe to the
mandated public and private offerings of the shares of their respective companies. The loans proved to be beneficial to all concerned parties: the employees
got valuable shares of stock; the foreign-owned firms who sold the stock got
employees with stakes in the companies' post-indigenization future; and the
foreign-owned bank got more Nigerian borrowers, helping it comply with
Central Bank regulations in that regard.
As mentioned above, firms affected by the Decree disposed of their required
percentage of shares either through private or public offerings; and when no
buyer could be found, the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry stepped
into the breach, purchasing unsold shares for eventual resale to Nigerians. A
Op.

cit.. supra n. 29, at 4.

"Op. cit., supra n. 30, at 5.
"Op. cit.. supra n. 30, at 3.
"Op. cit., supra n. 26.
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Federal board named the Capital Issues Commission was charged with the
responsibility of evaluating all shares offered to the public at large. Generally, it
took into account both actual and project earnings per share. However, because
reliable balance sheets were not uniformly available for the Commission's
inspection, no truly reliable valuation could be made in some cases.36
Persons who bought shares at private offerings were on their own in
evaluating their purchases.
Pre-Decree Indigenization
Of course, Nigeria has not waited until now to take steps to assure that the
"commanding heights" of her economy remain locally controlled-and these
days the most "commanding height" is, of course, oil. Beginning in 1965-two
years before the outbreak of civil war-the government declared its intention to
operate the railroads, telephone systems, and the electric industry. Since then,
it has also acquired substantial minority interests in foreign banks and automobile assembly plants, 37 and just this May, concluding pre-Decree discussions
with the affected oil companies, announced agreemerit in principle to acquire
55 percent of the Nigerian operations of Gulf, Mobile, Italy's Agip, France's Elf
38
Group, and the Royal Dutch Shell Group-British Petroleum joint venture.
Negotiations between the government and the foreign companies, through
tough, have been marked by general good will on both sides, giving foreign
investors reasonable assurance that indigenization under the Decree will also go
well.
Conclusion
As it is with stock exchanges, uncertainty is the traditional bugaboo of
foreign investment. Businessmen and investors will not "play the game" if the
rules of the game are constantly changing.
In a world grown increasingly less certain about everything, it is refreshing to
find at least one developing country doing all it can to assure foreign investors
that it will respect the sanctity of officially permitted investments. The Nigerian
practice could well point the way to an enlightened compromise between the
conflicting demands on the industrialized world for assured access to resources
and the political demands of resource-rich developing countries. Workable
models like Nigeria's are in short supply.

"'Op. cit.. supra n. 30, at 6.
"Business International Corporation. Investing. Licensing and Trading Conditions Abroad
(Nigeria) (June 1973) (Copyright).
38
Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1974. at 5. col. 2.
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